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I
INTRODUCTION
The extent to which federal laws and regulations, particularly the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act (TSCA),' have adversely affected the development of new
chemical products, has become a matter of considerable interest and controversy.
The question is both important and complex.
The importance of the question has at least two dimensions. First, the question
is important because of its implications on how environmental health laws are
administered. If it becomes generally accepted that these laws significantly
impinge on innovation, it is then likely that the implementing regulations, and
perhaps even the laws themselves, will be modified so as to impose less of a burden
on industry. Modifications of TSCA regulations for reviewing new chemicals have
already been proposed. 2
The second reason the regulation-innovation question is important is that it
highlights in a dramatic way the need to consider the interaction and relationship
between private sector economic processes and governmental regulation. In the
health and safety area, the interaction between the two major institutions of
society, government and industry, has been largely neglected except for rhetorical
purposes. Society is beginning to realize that the true effects of regulations cannot
be understood without understanding how the regulations relate to the decision-
making process, the flow of money, and other characteristics of the private sector.
The relationship between regulation and innovation is quite complex. It has
been examined in detail only in the context of new drugs, 3 an area that will not be
covered in this article. The complexity derives from the many different regula-
tions, the diversity of the chemical industry, and the differences among types of
innovation. Each of these factors will be discussed briefly.
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1. 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1982).
2. The most important proposed modifications would exempt more than half of the new chemcials
now covered by TSCA from having to submit a premanufacturing notification. See Draft of EPA Proposed
Exemption for Site-Limited Chemtcal Intermediates and New Chemicals Manufactured in Quantties of 10,000 Killograms
or Less, 6 CHEM. REG. REP., (BNA) No. 8 (May 21, 1982).
3. See, e.g., IMPACT OF PUBLIC POLICY ON DRUG INNOVATION AND PRICING (S. Mitchell & E. Links
eds. 1976); REGULATING NEW DRUGS (R. Landau ed. 1973); D. SCHWARTZMAN, INNOVATION IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY (1976).
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A. Types of Regulations
There are a large number of health and safety statutes that have an impact on
the chemical industry. For the purpose of considering their impact on innovation,
three general types of regulatory schemes should be distinguished. These schemes
should be labeled as follows: environment-oriented, product registration, and
product oversight.
Environment-oriented statutes are the most common, and they are focused on
the level of contamination of some aspect of the environment. Included in this
category are the Clean Air Act, 4 the Clean Water Act, 5 the Occupational Safety
and Health Act, 6 the Safe Drinking Water Act, 7 the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 8 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act. 9
Product registration statutes require that particular kinds of products be
approved by the government before they can be manufactured or marketed. The
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act' 0 and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)'I are the only two health and safety statutes in this
category.
Product oversight statutes focus on particular products but do not require gov-
ernment approval for new products. The Hazardous Substances Act, 12 the Con-
sumer Product Safety Act, 13 the Flammable Fabrics Act, 14 and the Toxic
Substances Control Act 15 are examples.
Liability laws, which are primarily state laws, constitute still another category.
Since liability laws were canvassed in a recent Congressional report, no further
mention will be made of them.'
6
The reason for making these distinctions is that the different types of regulatory
schemes may have quite different effects on innovation.' 7 Some of these differ-
ences will be described later.
B. Diversity of the Chemical Industry
The chemical industry produces a vast array of products which are used by all
other industries in the economy. The TSCA inventory of chemicals in commerce
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1976).
5. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. V 1981).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1976).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 300(f) (1976).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1976).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1976).
10. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1976).
11. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1982).
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1274 (1982).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 2051 (1982).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 1193 (1982).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1982).
16. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 97th CONG., 2D SESS.,
REPORT ON INJURIES AND DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS WASTES-ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF
LEGAL REMEDIES (Comm. Print 1982).
17. See Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Admntstratve Law: 4 Conceptual Framework, 69 CALIF. L.
REV. 1259 (1981).
[Vol. 46: No. 3
EFFECTS ON INNOVATION
lists more than 55,000 chemicals, and this inventory excludes thousands of drugs,
pesticides, food additives, and cosmetics.' 8 Some chemical products are used only
to make other chemicals. Others are sold to processors who incorporate them into
consumer goods. Many major chemical companies, such as Dow and DuPont, sell
some of their products directly to the buying public.
The Standard Industrial Classification Manual contains eight major divisions
of chemicals and allied products: industrial inorganic chemicals; plastics, synthetic
rubber, and man-made fibers; drugs; soaps, detergents, and cosmetics; paints,
varnishes, and allied products; agricultural chemicals; industrial organic chemi-
cals, and miscellaneous chemical products. 19 Some chemical companies only pro-
duce one product or one type of product. Many companies produce products in
several or all of the major industry divisions. Many companies that make chemi-
cals are not primarily chemical companies. Four of the top ten chemical producers
in 1981 (Exxon, Shell Oil, Gulf Oil, and Occidental Petroleum) were oil compa-
nies.20 Another two of the top ten had only about half their total sales attributable
to chemicals (Union Carbide, 57%; W.R. Grace, 45%).2 1 The top twenty-five
included a photographic equipment company (Eastman Kodak), a dairy products
company (Borden), and U.S. Steel. 22
A total of 11,500 companies are estimated to be involved in producing and
processing chemicals. 23 About 1,000 companies are in the basic chemical industry
and 3,100 in allied products with the remaining 7,400 in chemical processing. 24 In
1980, thirty-six companies had chemical sales of over $1 billion. 25 But there are
thousands of chemical companies with annual sales of less than $1 million. In
1981, DuPont spent $575 million on research and development, and Dow spent
$404 million. 26 But thousands of companies do no research and development.
Some companies depend on innovation for their continued existence. Many do
not innovate at all. In short, the industry is so large and diverse that it is almost
impossible to subject it to valid generalizations.
C. Varieties of Innovation
Most broadly, innovation can be described as the creation and introduction of
something new. Technological innovation has been defined as "a conscious
attempt to bring about, through technology, a change in the way man lives. ' '27 It
18. OFFICE OF Toxic SUBSTANCES, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Toxic SUB-
STANCES CONTROL ACT (TSCA) CHEMICAL SUBSTANCE INVENTORY (1979 & Cum. Supp. June 1980).
19. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION MANUAL Ill
(1972).
20. Facts and iguresfor the Chemical Industry, CHEMICAL & ENG'G NEWS, June 8, 1981, at 31, 44.
21. Id
22. Id
23. Foster D. Snell, Inc., Study of the Potential Economic Impacts of the Proposed Toxic Substances
Control Act as Illustrated by Senate Bill S. 776, at 22 (1975).
24. Id.
25. Id
26. Facts and Figuresfor Chemical Research & Development, CHEMICAL & ENG'G NEWS, July 26, 1982, at
38, 64.
27. Drucker, Technological Trends in the Twentieth Century, in TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION: A CRIT-
ICAL REVIEW OF CURRENT KNOWLEDGE 10 (1975).
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is the process by which technological knowledge is developed and transformed into
specific products, processes, and services to meet human needs.
This article defines innovation to include the sequence of steps in the concep-
tion, development, testing, production, adoption, and diffusion of a technology.
The focus, however, will be on the stages between invention and widespread diffu-
sion because these are the stages most likely to be affected by regulation.
Distinctions must be made among the kinds of innovations as well as among
the stages in the innovation process. Most important is the distinction between
product and process innovations. Much of the innovation in the chemical industry
is changed processes, that is, improved methods for making the same product.
This article, however, will concentrate on the innovation of new products because
this topic has been the subject of primary concern with respect to the chemical
industry.
Given the different types of regulatory schemes, the diversity of the chemical
industry, and the varieties of innovation, it should not be hard to understand why
the interrelationship of the three is very complex. Throughout the rest of this
article the reader should keep in mind that there are likely to be exceptions to
almost every statement that is made.
II
ADVERSE EFFECTS OF REGULATION ON INNOVATION
To understand how regulation affects innovation in the chemical industry it is
first necessary to understand the dynamics of the innovation process in the
industry. This is difficult, however, not only because of the complexities discussed
above, but also because there have been very few empirical examinations of the
innovation process in the chemical industry. To understand chemical innovation,
three interrelated levels or models must be considered: the industry level, the com-
pany level, and the product level.
A. Industry-Level Effects: Market Concentration
Government regulation may have the effect of increasing concentration in an
industry by increasing the cost of developing and marketing products and thereby
eliminating all but large firms from the market. This effect, if it occurs, will prob-
ably influence the rate and type of innovation that takes place in the industry,
although the existing literature contains contradictory findings on the relationship
between innovation, on the one hand, and industry concentration and the size of a
firm, on the other.28
Tables 1 and 2 present data on concentration in the chemical industry. Other
measures could be used, but by almost any measure there has not been any signifi-
cant trend toward increasing concentration in the industry.
28. 2 C.T. HILL, A STATE OF THE ART REVIEW OF THE EFFECTS OF REGULATION ON TECHNOLOG-
ICAL INNOVATION IN THE CHEMICAL AND ALLIED PRODUCTS INDUSTRIES -"CAPI PROJECT" 80-83
(1975).
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TABLE 1
SHARE OF VALUE OF SHIPMENTS ACCOUNTED FOR BY THE EIGHT
LARGEST COMPANIES IN SEGMENTS OF THE CHEMICAL
INDUSTRY, 1977 AND EARLIER YEARS*
Percentage Share
SIC Code Industry 1947 1958 1967 1972 1977
2812 Alkalies & Chlorine 93 89 88 91 87
2813 Industrial Gases 88 88 84 81 84
2816 Inorganic Pigments NA 83 78 72 78
2819 Industrial Inorganic Chemicals, nec** NA NA NA 52 49
2821 Plastic Materials & Resins NA NA NA 41 37
2822 Synthetic Rubber 100 86 82 81 83
2823 Cellulosic Manmade Fibers NA NA 99 NA 100
2824 Organic Fibers, Noncellulosic NA NA 94 91 90
2833 Medicinals & Botanicals NA 77 81 75 78
2834 Pharmaceutical Preparations 44 45 40 44 43
2841 Soap & Other Detergents NA NA 78 74 71
2842 Polishes & Sanitation Goods NA NA NA 54 56
2844 Toilet Preparations 38 45 52 53 56
2851 Paints & Allied Products NA NA 35 34 36
2865 Cyclic Crudes & Intermediates NA NA 64 52 60
2869 Industrial Organic Chemicals, nec NA 70 58 57 55
2873 Nitrogenous Fertilizers NA NA NA 53 54
2874 Phosphatic Fertilizers NA NA NA 47 57
2875 Fertilizers, mixing only 28 28 36 38 37
2979 Agricultural Chemicals, nec NA NA NA 57 64
2891 Adhesives & Sealants NA NA NA 31 35
2899 Chemical Preparations, nec NA NA 28 26 25
* Excludes industry segments with 1977 value of shipments of less than $1 billion.
"nec" means not elsewhere classified.
Source: BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1977 CENSUS OF MANUFACTURES, CON-
CENTRATION RATIOS IN MANUFACTURING, at 9-30-33 (Subject Series MC77-SR-9).
Tables 1 and 2 may underestimate the degree of concentration in certain seg-
ments of the industry. For example, most pesticide manufacturers would be
included in Standard Industrial Code (SIC) 2879. It is generally agreed that there
are no small companies that manufacture pesticide ingredients, but the many
small companies that mix ingredients together (known as formulators) are
included in the same category and thus reduce the concentration ratio.
Even in the pesticides industry, however, there has not been any detectable
trend toward concentration. For insecticides (SIC 28795), the eight-, twenty-, and
fifty-company concentration percentages were unchanged between 1972 and 1977.
For herbicides (SIC 28796), the eight-company concentration percentage declined
from eighty-nine to eighty-four percent between 1972 and 1977, and the twenty-
and fifty-company percentages were unchanged. No data for years earlier than
1972 are available, and for fungicides (SIC 28797 and 28798) only 1977 data are
available. There was an increase in concentration for household pesticidal prepa-
rations (SIC 28799), but this is a comparatively small portion of the pesticide
market. An examination of companies entering and exiting the pesticide
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TABLE 2
SHARE OF VALUE OF SHIPMENTS ACCOUNTED FOR BY THE FIFTY
LARGEST COMPANIES IN SEGMENTS OF THE CHEMICAL
INDUSTRY, 1977 AND EARLIER YEARS*
Industry
Alkalies & Chlorine
Industrial Gases
Inorganic Pigments
Industrial Inorganic Chemicals, nec**
Plastic Materials & Resins
Synthetic Rubber
Cellulosic Manmade Fibers
Organic Fibers, Noncellulosic
Medicinals & Botanicals
Pharmaceutical Preparations
Soap & Other Detergents
Polishes & Sanitation Goods
Toilet Preparations
Paints & Allied Products
Cyclic Crudes & Intermediates
Industrial Organic Chemicals, nec
Nitrogenous Fertilizers
Phosphatic Fertilizers
Fertilizers, mixing only
Agricultural Chemicals, nec
Adhesives & Sealants
Chemical Preparations, nec
Percentage Share
1958 1967 1972
NA NA 100
98 99 98
99 99 99
NA NA 93
NA NA 90
NA NA 100
NA NA NA
NA 100 100
98 98 98
87 90 91
NA 92 92
NA NA 78
87 90 91
NA 61 66
NA 97 96
96 92 92
NA NA 100
NA NA 99
64 72 74
NA NA 89
NA NA 76
NA 62 58
* Excludes industry segments with 1977 value of shipments of less than $1 billion. Data for 1947 are
not available for the fifty largest companies.
** "nec" means not elsewhere classified.
Source: BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1977 CENSUS OF MANUFACTURES, CON-
CENTRATION RATIOS IN MANUFACTURING, at 9-30-33 (Subject Series MC77-SR-9).
manufacuring industry between 1972 and 1977 found that ten companies started
manufacturing basic pesticide ingredients for the first time in the period between
1972 and 1977 while thirteen companies stopped manufacturing pesticides. 29
Three of the companies that stopped produced only very small amounts of one
chemical. 30
The above data are not intended to imply that small companies are not pre-
cluded from manufacturing pesticides. In fact, they are. But the barriers to
entering the market are the large capital investment required for manufacturing
facilities, the large cash reserves necessary either to purchase patent licenses or to
sort through a large number of chemicals looking for a suitable pesticide, and the
network of salesmen to distribute the product. Regulatory requirements are also a
barrier to entering the market, but if all of the regulatory requirements disap-
peared, it would still be impossible for a small firm to get into the pesticide manu-
29. Conservation Foundation, Product Regulation and Chemical Innovation IV-14 (1980) (report to
the Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress) [hereinafter cited as CF-OTA Study].
30. Id.
SIC Code
2812
2813
2816
2819
2821
2822
2823
2824
2833
2834
2841
2842
2844
2851
2865
2869
2873
2874
2875
2979
2891
2899
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facturing business. The concentration data cited above indicate that increases in
regulatory requirements during the 1970's have not had a significant concen-
trating effect.
Research and development is probably more concentrated than sales or pro-
duction in the chemical industry. Over 60% of the research and development
funds for industrial chemicals are spent by four companies. DuPont alone
accounts for about one-fourth of all research and development in the chemical
industry.3 1 Seventy-one percent of the new chemical notifications under TSCA
were submitted by companies with sales over $500 million. Only 2% of the notifi-
cations were submitted by companies with sales under $10 million. 32 This would
suggest that small companies do little new chemical innovation. One, therefore,
need not worry too much about regulation impeding innovation in small compa-
nies. However, some industry representatives have interpreted the TSCA figures
to indicate that regulation has already put an end to small companies developing
new chemicals, and that in the good old days, perhaps before 1976, many small
companies developed many new chemicals.
B. Company-Level Effects: Research and Development
There are two types of innovation-related decisions that are applicable to an
entire company, not just to an individual product. The first is the philosophy or
strategy that the firm wants to pursue with respect to innovation. The second is
the annual decision of how much to invest in research and development.
The specific decisions within a firm regarding innovation are governed, iniplic-
itly or explicitly, by the corporate strategy of innovation. Such strategies are of
great importance, but they are also elusive because they can take a variety of
forms, and only rarely are they explicitly documented.
The most basic strategy choice, in the realm of innovation, is whether a firm
wants to engage in innovative product activity at all. All firms within some indus-
tries, and many firms within innovative industries such as the chemical industry,
choose to compete for market share by marketing at a lower price rather than by
developing new products. 33 Sometimes the pricing strategy itself depends on
making process innovations that permit more efficient production. Another
strategy choice may involve the choice of product lines where research emphasis
will be placed. Still another choice is between conducting research in-house or
buying patent rights from other, sometimes foreign, firms.
One effect of health and safety regulations may be to place more emphasis on
minor improvements in existing products than on more radical innovations.
Because existing products have been on the market their health and environ-
mental effects are presumed by some to be better known than those of a com-
31. Falwell, R&D Support Starts 1980"s wth Strong Year, CHEMICAL & ENG'G NEWS, Jan. 21, 1980, 12,
14.
32. Address by Douglas G. Bannerman, Impact of TSCA on Market Introduction of New Chemicals,
American Chemical Society in Las Vegas, Nev., slide 8 (Mar. 31, 1982).
33. E. MANSFIELD, J. RAPAPORT, J. SCHNEE, S. WAGNER & M. HAMBURGER, RESEARCH & INNOVA-
TION IN THE MODERN CORPORATION 4-5 (1971) [hereinafter cited as MANSFIELD].
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pletely new compound. Also, government regulators are likely to give more
careful scrutiny to major new products than to minor improvements. The time
delay involved in government regulation may also discourage radical innovations.
The data on new pesticide chemicals (Figure 1) and on new pharmaceutical
chemicals (Figure 2) lend some limited support to this thesis. There has been a
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FIGURE 2
COMPARISON OF THE ANNUAL APPROVALS OF NEW DRUG
MOLECULAR ENTITIES REFLECTING FDA's VALUE
JUDGMENT OF THERAPEUTIC POTENTIAL
Number of
New Molecular Entities
0-0
B-
a-
Total Number of New Molecule Entities
Sum of NCE's (new chemical entity) that are Important and Modest Gains
Number of Important Gains
Source: OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, PATENT-TFERM
EXTENSION AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 26 (1982).
slight decline in the average number of new pesticide chemicals registered since the
late 1960's, but the pattern is erratic, and the largest number of registrations was
in 1975 when the 1972 amendments to FIFRA34 were beginning to have their full
impact. Similarly, the number of new pharmaceutical chemicals declined sharply
in the early 1960's, but most of the decline was in drugs that represented little or
no therapeutic gain. Mansfield found that in the chemical industry generally, the
percentage of company-financed research and development expenditures devoted
to projects aimed at entirely new products and processes declined from 37% in
1967 to 31% in 1980.3 5 He also found that the percentage devoted to risky
34. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1982).
35. MANSFIELD, supra note 33.
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projects, those with a less than fifty-fifty estimated chance of success, declined from
37% in 1967 to 27% in 1980.36
TABLE 3
RATIO OF RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES TO SALES:
DRUGS, PESTICIDES, AND CHEMICALS AS A WHOLE
Ratio, Ratio, Ratio,
Year Drugsa Pesticidesb Chemicalsc
1965 8.3
1966 8.6
1967 8.7 4.6
1968 8.5
1969 8.7
1970 8.8 4.3
1971 8.6
1972 8.6
1973 8.6
1974 8.6
1975 8.4
1976 8.4 8.1
1977 8.5 8.3 3.6
1978 8.2 8.8
1979 8.0
1980 8.5 3.3
1981 8.3
Sources: a. For drugs, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
PATENT-TERM EXTENSION AND THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY, 28 (1982).
b. For pesticides, NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL CHEMICALS Ass'N, 1976-1981 INDUSTRY PROFILE
STUDY (1977 to 1982). The NACA data on pesticides are highly variable because of year-to-year
differences in the companies responding to the survey.
c. For chemicals, NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD, NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, SCIENCE
INDICATORS 84 (1978).
Chemical industry research and development expenditures have generally
increased over the past decade, even when inflation is taken into account. This is
true not only for the industry as a whole, but also for its most intensely regulated
sectors, drugs and pesticides (see Table 3). For both pesticides and drugs, research
and development expenditures as a percentage of sales has remained constant at
about 8%, but there has been continuing real growth in sales. The result has been
continuing real growth in research and development. It is undoubtedly true that a
larger portion of this research and development is more "defensive" than it was ten
or fifteen years ago, but there are no good data on the way the research and devel-
opment expenditures are apportioned. Mansfield found that in the chemical
industry the proportion of research and development expenditures going for basic
research had declined in the last decade and that the proportion devoted to long-
term (more than five years) projects had also declined. 37 The ratio of industry
36. Id
37. Id
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research and development to sales for chemicals as a whole has also declined
significantly.
C. Product-Level Effects: The Commercialization Decision
The analysis done by a firm to decide whether or not to commercialize a new
product depends on the type of product line, the size of the firm, and the amount
of investment necessary to bring the new product to market. A specialty chemical
firm deciding to make fifty pounds of a new chemical may not do much more than
a back-of-the-envelope calculation to determine the selling price. At the other
extreme, a large firm may spend months analyzing alternative scenarios of cash
flow, return on investment, etc., before deciding to proceed with a major new
product.
The three elements that are crucial to any decision to commercialize are cost,
time, and uncertainty. All three may be adversely affected by regulation.
The impact of regulation on direct costs depends on the nature of the regula-
tory requirement and on the type of firm or product impacted. Pollution control
costs for industry as a whole amounted to $31.5 billion in 1980.38
These pollution control costs can adversely affect innovation in two ways. First,
by using capital funds which might otherwise be invested in new plants or new
equipment, pollution control investments may retard or prevent the introduction
of process changes. Second, the costs of operating the pollution control equipment
may reduce profits, which may in turn reduce the amount of money devoted to
research and the development of new products.
Regulations directed at new products, such as the manufacturing notification
requirements under TSCA39 or the pesticide registration requirements under
FIFRA,40 increase the direct cost of marketing a new product. The increase in
direct costs may result in a decision by a firm not to market a new product or even
not to develop new products at all.
The average research and development cost for each new pesticide registered
under FIFRA is estimated to be $6.9 million. 4 1 Of the $450 million total pesticide
industry research and development expenditures in 1981, 67% was devoted to
development of new products, 25% to product expansion, and 8% to reregistration
and product defense.4 2 The average cost of filing a TSCA premanufacturing noti-
fication has been estimated to range from $5,000 to $7,800. 43
The impact of direct regulatory costs on product innovation is roughly propor-
tional to the percentage that such costs bear to the total investment necessary to
38. Rutledge & Trevathan, Pollution Abatement and Control Expenditures, 1972-80, SURVEY OF CURRENT
BUSINESS, Feb. 1982, at 50, 52-53 (published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Dep't of
Commerce).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 2604 (1982).
40. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1982).
41. National Agricultural Chemical Ass'n, 1981 Industry Profile Study 7 (1982).
42. Id at 9.
43. E. Heiden & A. Pittaway, Impact of the Toxic Substances Control Act on Innovation in the
Chemical Specialties Manufacturers Industry, exhibit III-I (1982) (prepared for Chemical Specialties
Manufacturing Association).
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commercialize the product. For a large firm deciding whether to market a major
new product, the direct regulatory costs are unlikely to significantly influence the
decision. Data obtained from one large company on typical costs for developing a
new pesticide indicate that added regulatory costs of $1 million would not signifi-
cantly influence the decision to market the pesticide.4 4 On the other hand, for a
firm deciding whether to make a single small-volume batch of a new chemical, at a
cost of maybe $10,000 to $30,000, almost any regulatory costs may influence the
decision to proceed. The decision may hinge on the extent to which the costs can
be passed on to the customer.
For major products involving large capital investments, time delay is likely to
be a more important regulatory impact than direct costs. The same data on typ-
ical costs for a new pesticide cited above indicate that a two-year delay in regis-
tering the pesticide would reduce the cumulative net income from the product
over its total commercial life by more than 50%. 4 5 The National Agricultural
Chemicals Association (NACA) estimates that in 1981 the average time consumed
from submission of a registration application for a new pesticide chemical to
granting of a conditional registration was twenty-four months. 46 On the average,
more than seven years elapsed between initial discovery and conditional
registration.
FIFRA and the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act are the only health
safety statutes that impose significant time delays on new product development.
The ninety-day waiting period for new chemicals under TSCA is not likely to be a
major impediment to the devleopment of new chemicals except in the case of some
small-volume chemicals needed rapidly for a particular customer's use. Small-
volume exemptions now being considered by the EPA probably would eliminate
all cases when the TSCA time delay impeded innovation.
Uncertainty about what the regulatory requirements are, or will be, and
whether regulatory action will be taken, is often cited by industry as the aspect of
regulation that most impedes innovation. To a great extent the impact of uncer-
tainty is psychological. It may lead corporate decisionmakers at all levels to be
more cautious, to avoid radical innovations, and to resist putting large amounts of
capital into development because liquidity is the best hedge against an uncertain
future.
The impact of uncertainty may show up in more concrete ways than just
affecting corporate psyches. The minimum acceptable return on investment may
be adjusted for the degree of uncertainty, and thus a higher rate of return may be
demanded from regulated products. For example, Rohm & Haas calculates the
minimum rate of return for a proposed new chemical at rates varying from 15% to
25%, depending on the anticipated riskiness of the venture.47 Regulatory, tech-
nical, and marketing uncertainties contribute to riskiness.
44. This data was provided to the author on a confidential basis.
45. Id
46. Ser National Agricultural Chemical Ass'n, supra note 41, at 7.
47. Source for these figures is Dr. Sam Gusman, a coauthor of the CF-OTA Study, supra note 29. Dr.
Gusman was an employee of Rohm & Haas for 25 years, including positions as president of their pharma-
ceutical subsidiary and special assistant to the president of Rohm & Haas.
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Whether uncertainty has a major effect on innovation is not really known.
There is some evidence that, for example, commercial disposers of hazardous
wastes have not installed new and improved methods of waste disposal because of
the uncertainty over regulations to be issued by the EPA to implement the
Resources Conservation and Recovery Act. 48 On the other hand, at times when
industry has been faced with a choice between uncertainty and potentially more
stringent regulations, such as, for example, the testing requirements for new chemi-
cals under TSCA, the industry has chosen uncertainty.
D. Studies of TSCA Impact on Innovation
The most recent focus of concern about the impact of regulation on innovation
has been the effect of premanufacturing notification requirements under TSCA on
the introduction of new chemicals. Four studies have attempted to determine this
effect.
The first study, completed in December 1978, was done by Arthur D. Little,
Inc. (ADL) for the EPA.49 The study was done quite rapidly under pressure from
the EPA, and it is methodologically flawed to the point of being useless. The key
data on the economic impact of TSCA is based on a nonrandom sample of seven
chemicals. 50 Ten chemicals are listed in the table, but two are the same chemical
made by two different manufacturers, and two others are research and develop-
ment chemicals excluded from TSCA. The problems with the ADL report were
sufficiently great to be the subject of several days of Congressional hearings.-1 The
ADL study predicted that if TSCA notification costs were $10,000 per chemical
then the number of chemicals currently being commercially introduced would be
reduced by 50%. If notification costs were $40,000 innovation would be reduced
by 90%.52
In response to the problems with the ADL study, the EPA commissioned ICF,
Inc., another consulting firm, to do a similar study. The EPA issued the results in
September 1980. 5 3 The ICF study declined to predict the adverse impact of the
premanufacturing notice requirements on innovation, noting that "[e]ven with all
of the necessary data to measure the current rate [of new chemical introductions]
and the likely reduction (data that industry has been reticent to provide), it is
doubtful that the level of the reduction could be predicted ex ante. -154 The study
estimated the direct costs of reporting a new chemical to range from $1,000 to
$9,000, but stated that the direct cost "is the least important cost factor influencing
chemical company decisionmaking . . . the uncertainties associated with possible
EPA actions will generally outweigh the direct costs of complying with notice
48. 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1976).
49. ARTHUR D. LITTLE, INC., IMPACT OF TSCA PROPOSED PREMANUFACTURING NOTIFICATION
REQUIREMENTS (1978) (EPA document) [hereinafter cited as ADL Study].
50. Id at 111-12.
51. See Cost Benefit Analysi s. The Potential for Conhact of Interest. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight
and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. (1980).
52. ADL STUDY, supra note 49, at 1-3.
53. ICF, INC., ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED SECTION 5 NOTICE REQUIREMENTS, pts.
1-2 (1980) (EPA document).
54. Id at x.
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requirements.' '5 5
The ADL and ICF studies were followed by two related studies conducted by
the Regulatory Research Service (RRS), one for the Chemical Manufacturers
Association (CMA),56 and the other for the Chemical Specialties Manufacturers
Association (CSMA).-7
The RRS studies attempted to show that the dire predictions made in the ADL
study had in fact come to pass. The ADL study had estimated the number of new
commercial chemicals introduced at 1,000 per year prior to 1979 when the TSCA
premanufacturing notice requirements took effect. 58 A 1976 study by Foster Snell
estimated new chemical introductions at 2,200 per year.59 The RRS study for
CMA took the annual figure for premanufacturing notices to be 470, the number
filed between July 1980 and February 1981. It then reduced this figure by the
number of intermediate chemicals not sold to other manufacturers, and adjusted
to account for premanufacturing notices on products still in the development
stage, to arrive at an annual figure of 294 new chemicals per year, or a reduction in
the number of new chemicals of 71-88%.6o
The RRS study for CSMA produced much milder results. For ingredient sup-
pliers who were members of CSMA, new substance development on the average
was 26% lower for 1979-1981 than it was for 1976-1978.6 1 Ninety-eight percent of
this decline in innovation was attributable to smaller firms, those with sales under
$100 million. Product manufacturers (as contrasted with ingredient suppliers)
within CSMA experienced no decline in the number of new chemicals
manufactured.
The RRS studies have a number of limitations and shortcomings. First, there
is no defensible way to arrive at a good estimate of the number of pre-TSCA new
chemicals. Such an estimate involves making fine distinctions, for example,
between research and development chemicals and test-market chemicals, which
cannot accurately be made in retrospect. Second, many factors other than TSCA
affect the rate of innovation. Third, the economic value of new chemicals not
manufactured because of TSCA is likely to be less than the economic value of new
chemicals that are manufactured.
The ADL and RRS predictions contrast with the actual rate of premaufac-
turing notice submissions, shown in Figure 3. The number of premanufacturing
notices submitted has been increasing at a fairly steady rate. In the first half of
1982, 443 premanufacturing notices were submitted, a number equivalent to an
annual rate quite close to ADL's estimate of the pre-TSCA rate.
Figure 3
It is likely that TSCA has had some adverse impact on innovation. Much of
55. Id at xi.
56. E. Heiden & A. Pittaway, A Critique of the EPA "Economic Impact Analysis of Proposed Section
5 Notice Requirements" (prepared for Chemical Manufacturers Association).
57. See E. Heiden & A. Pittaway, supra note 43.
58. ADL STUDY, supra note 49, at 1-3.
59. See Foster D. Snell, Inc., supra note 23.
60. See E. Heiden & A. Pittaway, supra note 56, at 56.
61. See E. Heiden & A. Pittaway, supra note 43, executive summary at 1-2.
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this adverse impact is probably due to misconceptions about the premanufac-
turing notice requirements rather than the actual costs of submitting a
premanufacturing notice, which are generally insignificant. Many small manufac-
turers have the misperception that toxicological data must be submitted with a
premanufacturing notice, and some industry spokesmen have even encouraged
FIGURE 3
PREMANUFACTURING NOTICES
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them in this mistake.62
III
FAVORABLE EFFECTS OF REGULATION ON INNOVATION
Although the negative effects of regulation on innovation have received the
most attention, there are major favorable effects as well. The most obvious
favorable effect is the shift in corporate strategies and procedures so that new prod-
ucts and new plants are safer and healthier. Pollution control at new plants and
toxicological testing of new products are now important considerations which have
been institutionalized in the structure of most major corporations. The effect may
not be to increase the number or dollar value of new products or processes, but the
quality of innovations has been changed and the decisionmaking processes leading
to innovations also have been changed.
A. Process Innovations
Pollution control and other environmental or health regulations have stimu-
lated the development and adoption of a number of innovative production
processes. For example, a number of electrolytic caustic soda-chlorine plants have
converted from using mercury cells to diaphragm cells, and from using graphite
anodes to dimensionally stable anodes. Although costly, these changes have sub-
stantially reduced pollution problems and control costs and have increased plant
efficiency within the industry. The new processes have helped domestic producers
remain competitive with foreign producers and have reduced pressures for manu-
facturers to relocate abroad.6 3
Many industries have found that the cost of complying with new regulations
can be reduced through reclaiming and recycling material that previously was
discharged into the air or water. The electroplating industry, for example, was
expected to be one of the industries hit hardest by regulations covering toxic water
effluents. Since the industry consisted primarily of small, local operations and, at
the same time, was the largest contributor of toxic metal wastes into public sewage
treatment plants, the EPA estimated that up to 20% of all electroplating firms
would be forced out of business by the water regulations. This has not happened
because technological advances, both in production processes and recycling tech-
niques, have enabled many electroplaters to reduce their discharges of toxic
wastes. This has not only reduced the toxic waste problem but has also led to
major cost savings through the recycling of expensive metals.64
Many chemical firms have introduced process changes in response to environ-
mental regulations. A number of these changes have led to more efficient produc-
tion. However, it should not be implied that firms typically save money by
complying with pollution control regulations.
62. See, e.g., Address by J.R. Yost, Effects of TSCA on Small Chemical Companies, American Chem-
ical Society in Las Vegas, Nev., (Mar. 31, 1982).
63. H.J. Leonard, Environmental Regulations and U.S. Industrial Strength 165 (Tent. Draft July
1983) (forthcoming publication).
64. id at 167-68.
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B. Product Innovations
Regulations can also result in product innovations. This innovation can
happen in three ways. First, new markets may be opened because regulatory
action removes existing products from the market or threatens to do so. The ban-
ning of DDT and the likelihood that other chlorinated hydrocarbon pesticides
would be removed from the market encouraged the development and commercial-
ization of alternative kinds of pesticides. Proposed regulations to limit the uses of
asbestos have led to a search for alternative materials.
Second, apart from any direct regulatory action or threat, the existence of
health and safety regulatory mechanisms may encourage companies to develop
and market products whose commercial superiority rests in part on their being less
hazardous for humans and the environment. The development of so-called biora-
tional pesticides is an example.
Third, regulation can encourage the development of products necessary for
implementing regulatory action. A wide variety of new pollution control products
has been developed over the past fifteen years. Also, a number of devices for moni-
toring and analyzing chemicals have been invented and marketed because of the
demand created by regulations.
IV
STRIKING A BALANCE
Although regulation may have stimulated the development of some new prod-
ucts or processes, it is clear that health and safety regulation must be justified on
the grounds of improved health and safety, not as an obscure and indirect way of
stimulating innovation. How does one strike a balance between greater health
protection and more innovation? Unfortunately, it cannot be done through cost-
benefit analysis.
For almost all health and safety regulations the benefits in greater health pro-
tection are not known even within an order of magnitude. The costs of innovation
are even less quantifiable. This article has reviewed some of the problems of deter-
mining whether and to what extent innovation has been reduced by various regu-
lations. But even if one knew exactly how many new chemicals were not produced
because of TSCA regulations, one would not be able to express the cost in dollar
figures. Such a calculation would require knowing the consumer's surplus and the
producer's surplus of the chemicals not produced and subtracting from the sum of
these two figures the sum of the consumer's and producer's surpluses of the existing
chemicals that would have been replaced by the new chemicals. No one has even
made, or is likely to make, the crudest estimates regarding any of these numbers.
In the absence of any good analytical methodology for balancing health bene-
fits and economic costs, personal and institutional values will play a crucial role in
any decisions that are made. In fact it is probably a waste of time to try to pass
some overall judgment about the benefits and costs of health and safety regulation.
If one accepts the basic premise that some regulation of chemicals is socially desir-
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able then the more relevant question is how the existing regulatory framework can
be changed so that its benefits are increased and its costs reduced.
The exploration of how the regulatory framework can be improved is a discus-
sion that is beyond the scope of this article. It needs to follow three broad paths.
First, the statutes themselves should be examined for ways to make the legislative
framework of regulation simpler and more efficient. If the debate over the Clean
Air Act is any example, such an examination is not likely to happen in a construc-
tive way in the near future. Second, new ways of implementing the statutes
through innovative approaches such as regulatory negotiation, market mecha-
nisms, and better intergovernmental relations must be developed and tried.
Third, and probably most important, the quality of the civil service and of the
administration of the federal government must be improved. Any regulatory
scheme can be undermined by administrators who are poorly qualified for their
jobs or by good people who are forced to work under impossible constraints. The
current administration is simply the latest and most extreme force in a decade-long
effort to obstruct, denigrate, and paralyze the federal civil service. The so-called
regulatory reform legislation which came close to passage in the last session of
Congress would strike another blow in this direction. It will "reform" regulation
by making it more time-consuming and cumbersome and by making the regula-
tory process still more byzantine and inflexible. The time has come to try to restore
the integrity and efficiency of government service. Such a restoration would be a
crucial step in improving the effectiveness and efficiency of regulation and in
reducing any adverse effects on innovation.
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